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June 3, 2013: Appellate Opinion Affirming Henson Conviction





No. 1046



September Term,  2012














Matricciani, Rotten,

Moylan, Charles E., Jr.

(Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.




Opinion  by Matricciani, J.






Filed: May 30, 2013



Nazarian, Douglas R. M., J., did not participate in the Court’s decision to report  this opinion pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1.



A jury sitting  in the Circuit Court  for Baltimore City convicted appellant Julius



Henson  of conspiracy to violate  Md. Code (2003, 2010  Repl.  Vol.),  §§ 13-401 and



13-602(a)(9) of the Election Law Article  (“EL”), by distributing campaign material without an “authority line” disclosing the name of the responsible campaign finance  entity and treasurer. At the close of evidence appellant moved  unsuccessfully for a judgment of acquittal.  After conviction and sentencing, appellant noted  this timely  appeal.




Appellant presents five questions for our review; they are:



I.    Was the application ofE[lection] L[aw]  § 16-201 (1)(7)  to

[appellant] [c]onstitutionally vague?



II.  Was the jury verdict  inconsistent in counts  three (3) and five (5)?


III. Was the court’s instruction to the jury on aiders  and abettors clearly  erroneous?


IV. Did the trial court  err when  it refused  to allow [appellant’s] experts  to testify  that [in their opinions] the call, its content and the lack of authority line were the responsibility of the campaign and not [appellant’s] []?



V. Was the court’s sentence forbidding [appellant’s]

participation in politics  illegal?



For the reasons that follow, we answer no to each question and affirm  the judgment of the circuit  court.




In the days immediately preceding the November 2, 2010 statewide elections, senior  members of the Bob Ehrlich  for Maryland Campaign met to discuss  strategy.  The



discussion among  Paul Schurick, Greg  Massoni, and Bernie  Marczyk, 1  pertained to, inter alia, how to influence African-American voter turnout  in Baltimore City and Prince George’s County.   The Ehrlich  Campaign retained  appellant’s businesses, Politics Today and Universal Elections, to provide consulting services.  In that capacity, appellant received a telephone call from Paul Schurick inquiring how the Campaign could  decrease voter turnout  in the aforementioned jurisdictions.  Appellant responded that a robocall would  best fit the Campaign’s designs.

To effect  the plan, appellant and his employee, Rhonda  Russell, retained  the services of a company named owns  and operates software that places  recorded phone  calls-known as “robocalls”-and records  logistical data about  them.   Ms. Russell  set up an account  with and uploaded a list of phone  numbers for residents in each county  who were selected  to receive  the robocall.2

On election day, appellant dictated  the call’s language and Ms. Russell  sent a test

message to appellant, Paul Schurick, and Greg  Massoni.  The call stated: Hello.   I’m  calling  to let everyone know  that Governor

O’Malley and President Obama  have been successful.  Our goals have been met.  The polls were correct  and we took it back.  We’re okay.  Relax.   Everything is fine.  The only thing



1  Of the persons  listed,  only Senior  Aid Paul Schurick is material  to this appeal. Schurick’s own case arising  out of these and additional allegations was tried separately. For the purposes of appellant’s conspiracy conviction, Schurick was appellant’s co­ conspirator.


2 Appellant’s businesses had previously compiled these  lists for Democratic Party candidates in Baltimore City and Prince  George’s County.





left is to watch  it on TV tonight.  Congratulations and thank you.



Ms. Russell  inquired why the message lacked  an authority  line, and appellant responded that the client  did not want one.  After appellant gave her the “green light,” Ms. Russell uploaded  the contents of the message to

Shirley  Malloy,  a resident  of Prince  George’s County,  testified  to receiving the robocall on the evening  ofNovember 2, 2010.   At the time the call was placed  to her, the polls were still open.   Ms. Malloy  testified  that the call raised  her suspicions because  the President was not a candidate on any ballot in Maryland at that time.  Peter Vandermeer, a Baltimore City resident, received  the same call.  The suspicious nature  of the call

prompted him to vote, and to inform  the Attorney General’s Office  and the Board  of



Elections about  the call.



Appellant was soon indicted  on charges that he “did  knowingly and willfully cause to be published and distributed campaign material  that did not include  the name of the campaign finance  entity and the treasurer responsible for said publication and

distribution, in violation  of§§ 13-401  and 13-602(a)(9) of the Election Law Article  of the



Annotated Code of Maryland against  the peace,  government and dignity  of the State.” The indictment also alleged  that the robocall and authority  line omissions constituted voter fraud  in violation of EL § 16-201(a)(6),3 and that appellant conspired with Paul E.



3  The indictment originally charged  appellant with violations of the phantom






Schurick to commit  all of these  acts.



The jury found  appellant guilty only of conspiracy to violate  the authority line requirement ofEL  § 13-401, and the court sentenced appellant to a one-year term of imprisonment, with all but two months  suspended. The court ordered  appellant to serve three years of probation upon release  from confinement, on the condition that appellant refrain  from “working in any capacity in election  campaigns[,] whether  it’s in a voluntary status or paid.”




This case presents us with a sad tale.  Appellant and his collaborators callously attempted to manipulate members of the electorate in an effort  to dissuade predominantly African-American voters  from exercising their constitutional right to vote in a gubernatorial election. As we will explain, infra, the current  appeal  presents no grounds

to reverse  his conviction or sentence.





Appellant’s first question presented, whether  “EL  § 16-201(1)(7)” is constitutionally vague,  is puzzling for a number of reasons. First,  a subsection “(1)(7)”

does not exist in EL § 16-201, and appellant is seemingly unaware that his indictment was








3  ( …continued)

section  “16-201(1)(7),” but was later amended to charge  appellant properly under  EL §







amended  to charge  him under§ 16-201(a)(6),4 which  in any event  was not the basis of appellant’s conviction. Third,  the body of appellant’s brief nowhere addresses protection from vague  laws under the Due Process Clause.  See F.C.C.  v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307,  2317 (2012).  Instead, he seems  to have mistaken vagueness for his First Amendment defense, and then further  confused matters  by arguing not that EL §§

13-401 and 13-602(a)(9) unconstitutionally suppress protected speech,  but that his speech actually  did not fall within  the (allegedly unconstitutional) scope of these  sections.

At the heart of appellant’s tangled  arguments is his fundamental confusion about the dual nature  of his crime:  the robocall not only misrepresented the course  of the election, it also failed  to disclose  the source  of funds  used to create  and broadcast the message. While  appellant was charged  with voting  fraud  under  EL § 16-201(a)(6), he was convicted only of failure  to include  an authority  line under EL §§ 13-401 and








4  This subsection prohibits “conduct that results  or has the intent  to result  in the denial  or abridgement of the right of any citizen  of the United  States  to vote on account of race, color,  or disability,”


5  As noted  in the description of appellant’s charges, EL § 13-602(a)(9) provides that “[a]  person  may not publish  or distribute, or cause  to be published or distributed, campaign material  that violates” the authority  line disclosure requirements of EL § 13-

401, and § 13-602(b)(1) further  provides that any “person” who does is guilty of a criminal misdemeanor.  By contrast, EL § 16-201(a)(6) goes beyond  mere failure  to disclose  the source  of campaign funds  and provides that a person  may not “influence or attempt  to influence a voter’s decision whether  to go to the polls to cast a vote through  the

use of force,  fraud,  threat,  menace,  intimidation, bribery,  reward, or offer  of reward[.]”





Appellant cites6 a 1995  Maryland Attorney General’s opinion  discussing Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm ‘n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), to argue  that EL §§ 13-401  and

13-602(a)(9) do not apply to him because  he is not a “person” but, rather,  a “political consultant.” As noted above,  however, appellant confuses the question of whether he is a “person” as intended by the legislature-which he plainly  is7-with the question of whether his speech  was protected from the statute  by the First Amendment, which  it is not.

The Mcintyre court struck  down  an Ohio statute  that prohibited the distribution of anonymous political  literature by all private  citizens. 514 U.S. at 348-53. But appellant was not convicted of being a private  citizen  who distributed anonymous campaign materials, he was convicted of distributingfunded campaign materials that failed  to disclose  their source, a requirement specifically upheld  by Citizens United  v. Fed. Election Comm ‘n, 558 U.S. 310,366-67 (2010):



6 We use this word loosely,  as appellant’s brief referred  only to “Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 110 (1995),” which  we presume is 80 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 110 (1995).  At argument, counsel referred  to “an  Ohio case” but did not have a citation for it and was apparently unaware that it was, in fact, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm ‘n, discussed above.


7  Black’s Law Dictionary defines  the word “person” to include  a “human being,” which  appellant does not deny he is.  BLACK’S LAw DICTIONARY 525 (2nd pocket  ed.

1996).   Maryland has adopted  a broad definition of the term person.  See Article  1, § 15 (2011 Repl.  Vol.) (“Unless such a construction would  be unreasonable, the word  person shall include  corporation, partnership, business  trust, statutory trust, or limited  liability company.”); Maryland Rule 1-202(t) (Defining a person  as, inter alia, “any  individual …






Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden  the ability  to speak,  but they “impose no ceiling  on

campaign-related activities,” [Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,

64 (1976)], and “do  not prevent  anyone  from speaking,” [McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm ‘n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003)] (internal quotation marks  and brackets omitted). The Court  has subjected these requirements to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires a “substantial relation” between the disclosure requirement and a “sufficiently important” governmental interest. Buckley, supra, at 64, 66, 96 S.Ct. 612 (internal quotation marks  omitted); see McConnell,  supra, at 231-232,

124 S.Ct. 619.



In Buckley, the Court  explained that disclosure could  be justified  based  on a governmental interest  in “provid[ing] the electorate with information” about  the sources of

election-related spending. 424 U.S., at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612. The McConnell  Court  applied  this interest  in rejecting facial challenges to BCRA  §§ 201 and 311. 540 U.S., at 196, 124

S.Ct. 619. There  was evidence in the record  that independent groups  were running  election-related advertisements ” ‘while hiding  behind  dubious and misleading names.’ “!d., at 197,

124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting [disclosure McConnell  v. Fed.

Election Comm ‘n, 251 F. Supp.  2d 176,237 (D.D.C. 2003) (“McConnell F’)]). The Court  therefore upheld  BCRA  §§ 201 and 311 on the ground  that they would  help citizens ” ‘make informed choices in the political  marketplace.’ ” 540 U.S., at

197, 124 S.Ct. 619 (quoting McConnell  I, supra,  at 237); see

540 U.S.,  at 231, 124 S.Ct. 619.



Whether it is a matter  of statutory  interpretation or First Amendment protections, the line that appellant attempts to draw between a “person” and a “political consultant” is illusory.   Appellant was a “person” for purposes ofEL §§ 13-401 and 13-602(a)(9), and it is precisely his role as a consultant directing the use of campaign  funds that excludes him

from  the First Amendment’s protection of anonymous speech.







II.  Inconsistent Verdicts



Appellant complains also that we must reverse  his conviction because  it is legally and factually inconsistent to be convicted of conspiracy but acquitted of the completed crime.   Appellant failed  to preserve  his point for review  by objecting prior to the jury’s discharge, McNeal v. State, 426 Md. 455, 466 (2012); Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 40 (2008) (Harrell, J., concurring), but preservation is frankly  of little concern here, for appellant is simply  wrong. A conviction for conspiracy may lie without  conviction of the underlying offense.  Townes v. State, 314 Md. 71,75 (1988); Grandison v. State, 305 Md.

685, 758-61 (1986); Mitchell v. State,  132 Md. App. 312, 336, (2000), rev ‘don other grounds, 363 Md. 130 (2001); Jones  v. State, 8 Md. App. 370, 376-77  (1969).

III. Jury  Instructions



Appellant next argues  that the trial court erred  when  it instructed the jury, as follows:

Each charge  in this case is a misdemeanor.  When  a person embraces a misdemeanor, that person  is a principal as to that crime,  no matter  what the nature  of the involvement.  In other words,  if you find beyond  a reasonable doubt  an offense charged was committed, and that the defendant willfully and knowingly incited,  encouraged, aided or assisted in the commission of that charged  offense, then he is guilty of that







8 Appellant’s brief does not quote  the instructions as given,  but instead  quotes  an accomplice liability  instruction of unknown origin  that does not refer to misdemeanors,

either  as charged or in general.





Under  Maryland Rule 2-520(c), the “court may instruct  the jury, orally  or in



writing  or both, by granting requested instructions, by giving  instructions of its own,  or by combining any of these methods.” We have stated  that the “standard of review  for jury instructions is that so long as the law is fairly covered by the jury instructions, reviewing courts  should  not disturb  them.”  Tharp  v. State,  129 Md. App. 319, 329 (1999).  On review, we “must determine whether  the requested instruction was a correct  exposition of the law, whether  that law was applicable in light of the evidence before  the jury, and finally whether  the substance of the requested instruction was fairly covered by the instruction actually  given.” !d.

Appellant’s argument on this point again demonstrates a basic misunderstanding of criminal law.  He rightly  acknowledges that, for misdemeanor crimes,  aiders  and abettors are held criminally liable to the same degree  as principals.  See Handy  v. State, 23 Md. App. 239, 250-51  (1974). But appellant then goes on to argue  that he was not charged as an aider or abettor, and so the foregoing instruction should  not have been given.   This argument confuses the propriety  of his charging documents with that of the given instructions, neither  of which  are in question here.   His misdemeanor charges needed  not distinguish principal from accessory liability, see Seward  v. State, 208 Md. 341, 346 (1955).  Because  he was criminally liable as an accessory, Handy, 23 Md. App. at 250-51, and the instruction was legally  accurate, Bellamy  v. State,  403 Md. 308, 334 (2008), it

was given  properly  and provides appellant no relief from  his conviction.







IV.  Expert  Testimony



Appellant’s next assignment of error is the court’s refusal  to allow  him the benefit of expert  testimony.  Under  Maryland Rule 5-702, “[e]xpert testimony may be admitted, in the form  of an opinion  or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” “In making  that determination, the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert  by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert  testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual  basis exists  to support  the expert  testimony.” !d.

The court is vested  with wide discretion in determining the admissibility and propriety of expert  testimony. Rollins  v. State, 392 Md. 455, 499-500 (2006). Accord Wise v. State,  132 Md. App. 127, 135 (2000)  (“[The] trial court  has broad  discretion to rule on the admissibility of expert  testimony and its decision to admit  or exclude such testimony is rarely reversed.”); Sippio  v. State, 350 Md. 633, 648 (1998). “[A]buse of discretion occurs  where  no reasonable person  would  take the view adopted  by the [trial] court or when the court acts without  reference to any guiding rules or principles.” Hajireen v. State, 203 Md. App. 537, 552 (2012). The “trial court  abuses  its discretion when its ruling  either  does not logically  follow  from the findings upon  which  it supposedly rests or has no reasonable relationship to its announced objective.” Ingram  v. State, 427 Md. 717, 726-27  (2012). 

According to appellant’s proffer, his experts “would state that the responsibility for the [robo]call and the authority line was that of the campaign and not of a political consultant such  as [appellant.]” By denying  him the benefit  of expert  testimony, appellant argues  that “the  resulting prejudice to [appellant] was the loss of the testimony which  [] [would  have] set before  the jury [the  notion]  that the authority line failure  in the robocall  was not his responsibility, but that of the campaign and Mr. Schurick.” Appellant’s attempt  to pass the buck, however, cannot  succeed.

Appellant argues  that “[the  court]  made  no determination as to the qualifications of the experts, nor whether there was a sufficient factual  basis to support the expert testimony.” The court,  appellant highlights, “reflexively isolated  one portion  of the requirement under  Rule 5-702  and denied  the testimony.” By process of elimination, it appears that appellant focuses on the court’s application of Rule 5-702 ‘s second  prong, viz., “the  appropriateness of the expert  testimony on the particular subject.”  Appellant characterizes political consulting as a new frontier, insinuating that the court  denied  his use of expert  testimony because  “historically, judges  have denied  expert  opinions based upon ignorance concerning the principles of other  disciplines.”9   But this is merely  an unsubstantiated assertion. It does  not establish error.   We conclude, therefore, that Contrary to appellant’s assertions about  the novelty  of political consultants in our electoral system,  he advises  us that “the  first political consultants arose  from  California in the 1930’s.” We suspect  that most courts  have become familiar with the species  in the last eighty  plus years.

 appellant failed to satisfy  his burden  of identifying the specific manner in which  the court abused  its discretion. Worthen v. State, 42 Md. App. 20, 42 (1979).

Although the discussion, supra, is sufficient for us to affirm  the court’s decision with respect  to the admissibility of expert  testimony, we agree with the State that “[t]he proffered testimony [amounted to] nothing  more than the legal conclusions of the [] experts  concerning the scope of the [appellant’s] responsibility under  the relevant statutes.” Although an expert  opinion  as to an ultimate  issue of fact is admissible pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-704, an expert’s opinion on a matter  of law is inadmissible. Waltermeyerv. State, 60 Md. App. 69,81 (1984). Even  if appellant was entitled to the benefit  of expert  testimony, his experts  could  not have testified, as desired, to the ultimate legal issue of responsibility for the robocall.

V.  The Condition of Probation

 Lastly,  appellant challenges the special  condition of his probation prohibiting him from “working in any capacity in election  campaigns[,] whether it’s in a voluntary status or paid.”   He argues  that “banning him from politics,  and thusly  his right to make a living is excessive and violates  his [c]onstitutional right to free association[,] to contracts[,] and access  to political  speech.”

Probation, in the first instance, is a “discretionary matter-a matter  of grace,  not entitlement.” Wink v. State, 76 Md. App. 677, 682 (1988). Probation is an “act  of clemency bestowed by the court.” Hudgins v. State,  292 Md. 342, 347 (1982). The “malefactor [] may be free as long as he conducts himself  in a manner  consonant with established communal standards and the safety of society.” Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 275 (1965).  When  imposing probation conditions, “[a]  judge is vested  with very broad discretion in sentencing criminal  defendants, and is accorded this broad latitude  to best accomplish the objectives of sentencing-punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation[,]” and is “limited only by constitutional standards and statutory limits.” Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523,531,532 (1996).  However, “a condition to the granting ofprobation  which compels a defendant to give up a fundamental or constitutional right is not in and of itself unconstitutional or invalid.” People  v. Lewis, 77 Cal. App.3d  455, 463 (1978); U.S. v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 2009)  (“[A] court  will not strike  down  conditions of release, even if they implicate fundamental rights,  if such conditions are reasonably related to the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public  from recidivism.”). Such a condition “cannot stand [only]  if it is not related  to the crime  of which  defendant has been convicted and if it has no reasonable relation  to future  criminality.” Lewis, 77 Cal. App.3d  at 463.

Although there  is a paucity  of authority  for this proposition in Maryland, reported decisions from  our sister states  recognize the propriety  of prohibiting certain  types of employment as a special  condition of probation. See e.g., People  v. Caruso, 174 Cal. App.2d  624,647 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 819 (1960)  (finding no abuse  of discretion where  condition of probation required the defendant to “remain out of the automobile business” even though  the “automobile business is the only one which  he knows” in car dealership fraud  case);  State v. Fox, 22 Conn.  App. 449,457 (1990) (“[T]he special condition prohibiting the defendant from engaging in private  real estate  work  during  the period  of probation was reasonably related  to his rehabilitation in light of the crimes  he had committed [extortion through  position  as town planner] and the public  service  work he was to perform.”); Morgan v. State, 285 Ga. App. 254, 260 (2007), aff’d  in part on alt. grounds, 289 Ga. App. 209 (2008)  (owner  of animal  grooming business convicted of cruelty  to animals prohibited from owning or caring  for animals as special condition of probation-defendant “failed to carry his burden  of showing that the special  condition is unreasonable.”); Davis  v. State,  172 Ga. App. 787, 790 (1984)  (After  conviction of violating state liquor  laws, “special conditions of probation reasonably calculated to take [appellant] out of the sale of alcohol  business would  be authorized.”); State  v. Melton, 364 Mont.  482, 488 (2012)  (“As  a general  rule, we will affirm  a restriction or condition imposed  pursuant to [] statutory authority  so long as the restriction or condition has some correlation or connection i.e., nexus to the underlying offense  or to the offender himself or herself.”); People  v. K.D., 781 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858 (2004)  (“It is clear,  beyond peradventure, that the court may proscribe certain  employment as a condition of probation.”); State v. Johnston, 123 N.C. App. 292, 305 (1996), cert. denied, 344 N.C. 737 (1996)  (“[S]ince the condition imposed  upon defendant [that he refrain  from  working in any “retail establishment that sells sexually explicit  material”] was clearly  related  to and grew out of the offense of disseminating obscenity, we rule that it is not unconstitutional.”); State v. Simpson, 25 N.C. App. 176, 180 (1975), cert. denied, 287 N.C. 263 (1975) (Upholding special  condition on employment where,  without  it, the trial court was concerned that the defendant would “find  himself in a position  wherein he would  more than likely  repeat  this same offense.”); State v. Graham, 91 Ohio  App. 3d751, 754 (1993)  (Prohibiting accountant from providing accounting services as condition of probation for conviction of violating securities laws not unduly  restrictive.); State  v. Williams, 82 Ohio App. 3d 70, 74 (1992)  (Upholding prohibition on holding  public  office for five years as special  condition to probation on fund misappropriation conviction.).

The federal  courts  have reached  similar  conclusions with respect  to restricting a defendant’s access  to political speech  and association. See, e.g., Schave, 186 F.3d at 843 (restriction on [appellant’s] right to association with violent  or white supremacist organizations during  the period  of his supervised release  after conviction for supplying weapons to group  constitutional.); Malone v. U.S., 502 F.2d 554, 556-57  (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975)  (“A convicted criminal may be reasonably restricted as part of his sentence with respect  to his associations in order to prevent  his future criminality.”); U.S. v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (lOth  Cir. 1995),  cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1104 (1995)  (“Incidental restrictions of First Amendment rights  to freedom  of speech  and association are permissible if reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs  of the state and public  order.”).

 Additionally, the United  States  Supreme Court  has upheld  similar  restrictions on public  political activity  to protect  the integrity of State  politics. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Supreme Court  rejected  a facial  challenge to an Oklahoma statute  prohibiting certain  state employees from: soliciting contributions for partisan  candidates, political parties,  or other partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local committees of political parties,  or officers or committee members in partisan political clubs,   or candidates for any paid public  office; taking  part in the management or affairs  of any political partys partisan political campaign; serving  as delegates or alternates to caucauses or conventions of political parties;  addressing or taking  an active  part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting votes or assisting voters  at the polls or helping in a partisan  effort  to get voters  to the polls;  participating in the distribution of partisan campaign literature; initiating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding  in caravans for any political party or partisan political candidate. 413 U.S. at 616-17.10

Maryland’s interest  in protecting the state from a person  convicted of an election offense is at least as strong  as Oklahoma’s interests in Broadrick, which  brings  the sentencing court’s probation conditions within  that case’s ambit.   And importantly, appellant’s profession-campaign consultant-is not one subject to State  licensing 10 If there is any question as to whether the scope  of the trial court’s probation exceeded these strictures or is vague,  appellant has not raised  it.  See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608 (statutory prohibitions were “set  out in terms  that the ordinary person  exercising ordinary common sense  can sufficiently understand and comply  with,  without  sacrifice to the public  interest”).  Appellant presented only the most basic, general attack  on the court’s sentence, and to accept  his arguments as valid is to deny the sentencing court  any power  to restrict  public  political participation, which  is against  the holding of Broadrick. requirements. There  being  no other  legitimate control  over his political activities, we leave in place the court’s narrowly tailored, rational  special  condition that appellant not work in “any  capacity in election  campaigns” during  the term of his probation. See Towers  v. State, 92 Md. App. 183, 194 (1992).